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Dog Whistles and Democratic Mandates
Author(s) -
GOODIN ROBERT E.,
SAWARD MICHAEL
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
the political quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.373
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1467-923X
pISSN - 0032-3179
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-923x.2005.00708.x
Subject(s) - mandate , politics , democracy , public administration , political science , law and economics , political economy , law , economics
Manipulative mixed messages from candidates to voters affect what governments are entitled to do in office. A party that wins an election gains a 'mandate to rule'. But there is a second type of mandate: a 'policy mandate' to enact specific policy proposals central to the winning party's campaign. Mixed‐message politics in general can undermine policy mandates, and the use of 'dog whistle politics' ‐ telling one group of voters one thing, while allowing or encouraging another group to believe another ‐ makes the inferring of policy mandates especially problematic. Referendums provide only a partial remedy to dog whistle politics. Winning a clear policy mandate means forgoing dog whistle politics, despite the short term electoral advantage they may deliver.