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The Ineffectiveness of the Denial of Free Will
Author(s) -
Casado Rubén
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01451.x
Subject(s) - denial , omnipresence , presumption , action (physics) , epistemology , free will , object (grammar) , philosophy , law and economics , psychology , sociology , law , political science , psychoanalysis , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics
Free will, before being an object of beliefs or theories susceptible of verification, is the omnipresent supposition of our conscious life. This paper claims that this omnipresence, even though it is not enough to validate theoretically free will, entails two significant consequences. First, that free will is the essential presumption of our actions, without which they would become incomprehensible. Second, that all denial of this – a rational action in itself – presupposes that which is denied.