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On the Concept of a Game
Author(s) -
Ellis Jonathan
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2011.01443.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , philosophy , domain (mathematical analysis) , position (finance) , reflexive pronoun , aesthetics , sociology , mathematics , economics , mathematical analysis , finance
In an essay for Brian Leiter's turn‐of‐the‐millennium The Future for Philosophy , Thomas Hurka writes: [A]n anti‐theoretical position is properly open only to those who have made a serious effort to theorize a given domain and found that it cannot succeed. Anti‐theorists who do not make this effort are simply being lazy, like Wittgenstein himself. . . . [I]n one of the great underappreciated books of the twentieth century Bernard Suits gives perfectly persuasive necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being a game. In this note, it is shown that the conditions Suits and Hurka celebrate are neither necessary nor sufficient for something's being a game.

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