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Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Nonsense
Author(s) -
Proessel Dean
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00262.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , certainty , philosophy , nonsense , epistemology , principal (computer security) , computer science , gene , chemistry , biochemistry , operating system
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein wrote: “Skepticism is not irrefutable , but obviously nonsensical when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked.” In this paper I show how Wittgenstein developed this insight in On Certainty . My principal aim is to show that this is a logical insight, that it is bound up with the distinction between saying and showing , and that one misses the point of On Certainty if one reads it, as some commentators have, in epistemological terms. Throughout all of this I pay special attention to why Wittgenstein thought that skepticism is nonsensical, and what it might mean to say that philosophy is a logical investigation.