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Trapped in a “Secret Cellar”: Breaking the Spell of a Picture of Unconscious States
Author(s) -
Gunnarsson Logi
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00257.x
Subject(s) - unconscious mind , spell , finkelstein's test , philosophy , psychoanalysis , epistemology , terminology , personal unconscious , psychology , linguistics , theology , medicine , physical therapy
I argue for two theses: 1) An unconscious belief that p is not the same attitude as a conscious belief that p (here I am disagreeing with David Finkelstein and Richard Moran). 2) An unconscious belief that p is the attitude it is on account of its rational connection with the conscious belief that p (taking issue with Georges Rey). I defend parallel theses for emotions. I then argue that Wittgenstein can be understood as accepting both theses and that this shows – contrary to the interpretations of Jacques Bouveresse and Donald Levy – that Wittgenstein can accept talk not only of descriptive but also dynamic unconscious states (in Freud's terminology).