Premium
The Truth about Philosophical Investigations I §§134–137 1
Author(s) -
Vision Gerald
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
philosophical investigations
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.172
H-Index - 14
eISSN - 1467-9205
pISSN - 0190-0536
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2005.00249.x
Subject(s) - redundancy (engineering) , interpretation (philosophy) , odds , epistemology , philosophy , coherence theory of truth , computer science , pragmatic theory of truth , linguistics , logistic regression , machine learning , operating system
A broad, though not unanimous, consensus among commentators is that the later Wittgenstein subscribes to a redundancy conception of truth. I reject that interpretation. No doubt much depends on what is meant by a redundancy theory. But once even mildly plausible versions of that view are isolated a review of the relevant texts shows that the evidence for that interpretation collapses. Moreover, the redundancy interpretation is at odds with guiding prescriptions in the post‐1932 corpus. Wittgenstein doesn’t hold that truth can be defined or characterized thinly, as redundancy theorists propose, but that it isn’t susceptible to any such generic treatment.