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Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate Governance
Author(s) -
Radin Robert F.,
Stevenson William B.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
corporate governance: an international review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.866
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1467-8683
pISSN - 0964-8410
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2006.00523.x
Subject(s) - corporate governance , accounting , business , legislation , agency (philosophy) , empowerment , mutual fund , power (physics) , principal–agent problem , corporate law , public administration , finance , political science , law , sociology , social science , physics , quantum mechanics
Governance of public corporations in the United States has operated under the agency model with regulatory strengthening since the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley legislation. With this foundation in place, boards are empowered to utilise their power and influence and can effectively monitor the actions of management, intervening where necessary. In effect, the rules of engagement embodied in the structure and the law guide interactions and empowerment. The governance model of the mutual funds industry, representing over 8 trillion dollars, is often viewed as a mirror of the corporate world, but upon closer analysis is found to have significant structural differences that dilute the authority of directors. The two models are compared and analysed with recommendations made to strengthen the oversight of mutual funds.