Premium
Self‐serving Behaviour Amongst Company Directors: An Australian Investigation
Author(s) -
Steen Adam,
Horrigan William
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
corporate governance: an international review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.866
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1467-8683
pISSN - 0964-8410
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8683.1995.tb00090.x
Subject(s) - shareholder , business , agency (philosophy) , accounting , principal–agent problem , agency cost , public relations , finance , corporate governance , political science , philosophy , epistemology
This study addresses the question of whether directors of publicly listed companies engage in self‐serving behaviour. Specifically, the enquiry considers whether directors in failing firms reduce personal shareholdings in their firms as failure approaches. The answer not only has implications for shareholders and regulators but has importance in terms of agency theory. While it appears that directors of failed firms do not hold fewer shares or reduce their shareholdings in their own firms, it seems that they do not increase their shareholdings as frequently as those in non‐failed firms.