The Use of “Public Reason” by Religious and Secular Citizens: Limitations of Habermas’ Conception of the Role of Religion in the Public Realm

While Habermas’ careful delineation of the implications of a commitment tofreedom of religion for both secular and religious citizens gives rise to a muchmore nuanced account of the role of religion in both the formal and informalpublic realm, the paper argues that Habermas does not resolve the uncomfortabletension in his approach between his continued commitment to strict politicalsecularism and his picture of a postsecular society characterised by a criticalengagement between religion and the traditions of the Enlightenment. The ensuingdifficulties are particularly apparent in relation to two concomitant conceptscentral to Habermas’ framework: (1) his account of the institutional translationproviso and (2) his conception of reason and religion as two separate, sovereignrealms. Both aspects of Habermas’ approach raise worries regarding the equalstanding of all citizens, albeit for different reasons. While the institutionaltranslation proviso is insufficient to secure the discursive equality ofreligious citizens, Habermas’ failure to clearly distinguish between theepistemic and institutional sovereignty of the religious realm leads him tomisconstrue the complex relationship between law and religion. His subsequentreluctance to intervene in the ‘internal’ affairs of religious institutions andorganisations threatens to compromise the equal rights – including the right tofreedom of religion – of traditionally marginalised members of religiouscommunities. While the problems and ambiguities inherent in the institutionaltranslation proviso suggest that the carefully delimited role Habermas assignsto religion in the liberal public realm is insufficient to address the fears ofcritics worried about the burdens the liberal state places upon religiousbelievers, his presumption in favour of the institutional sovereignty of aclearly delineated and distinct religious realm will continue to trouble thosewho fear that the liberal separation between state and organised religion hasenabled religious communities to escape critical scrutiny. In the light of theseconcerns the paper argues that within the context of a postsecular society a re-evaluation of the separation between state and organised religion is bestconceived of as a two way process. Not only must we re-evaluate the exclusion ofreligiously grounded arguments from the public realm, but we must also re-examine the notion of religion as an institutionally sovereign sphere in whichthe principles of reason, freedom and equality that govern the public realm donot apply. This interplay, however, has more far reaching implications for bothreligious and secular citizens than Haber