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HEDGES, BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE, AND EVIDENCE: A REPLY TO KYBURG'S “BELIEVING ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE”
Author(s) -
GOLDSZMIDT MOISÉS
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
computational intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.353
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1467-8640
pISSN - 0824-7935
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8640.1994.tb00147.x
Subject(s) - citation , library science , center (category theory) , psychology , computer science , crystallography , chemistry
Kyburg (1993) begins with the question of why we are more hesitant to believe the forecast we read in our newspapers than the ternperature we read on our thermometers. His question is important because as A1 researchers struggle to capture “commonsense reasoning” in some formal way it becomes clear that the formalization of the notion of “(plain) belief” is essential. Intuitively, to believe in A implies a commitment to act as if A were true for all practical prposes. This last part of the specification of belief is necessary because, given that the information we have about the world is imperfect and incomplete, there is little we can really be sure about. Except for some mathematical truths such as two plus two is four, death, and taxes, we seem not to have a perfect grip on events. Yet we get along fine. We are able to discriminate between the plausible and the implausible, to make up our minds and act. Kyburg argues that a uniform answer to his opening question can be given from two points of view: One view is that we constantly produce hedged claims about the world, the other is that we produce categorical claims in a hedged way. He captures the distinction between these views in the following pair of schemata, where BK represents background knowledge, E represents evidence, and C represents a conclusion: