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BELIEF IN METAPHOR: TAKING COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY SERIOUSLY 1
Author(s) -
Barnden John A.
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
computational intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.353
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1467-8640
pISSN - 0824-7935
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8640.1992.tb00378.x
Subject(s) - representation (politics) , mental representation , metaphor , inference , commonsense reasoning , scheme (mathematics) , feature (linguistics) , container (type theory) , computer science , mental state , psychology , cognitive science , artificial intelligence , linguistics , cognitive psychology , cognition , mathematics , philosophy , mechanical engineering , mathematical analysis , neuroscience , politics , political science , law , engineering
Evidence from real discourse suggests that beliefs and other mental states (propositional attitudes) are often viewed by speakers and other agents in a metaphorical way. Typical metaphors are MIND‐AS‐CONTAINER—the view of the mind as a container, with thoughts being physical objects inside it—or IDEAS‐AS‐INTERNAL‐UTTERANCES—the view of thoughts as natural language utterances inside an agent's head. It is therefore necessary for AI systems for mental‐state representation/reasoning to reason within such views. This approach contrasts with the highly abstract logical stance adopted in most propositional attitude research. A formal representation scheme based on the various metaphors has been partially developed. In this paper, it is mainly the MIND‐AS‐CONTAINER segment of the formal representation scheme that is detailed. Inference processes operating over the scheme are also presented. The crucial distinguishing feature of the representation scheme is that the description of mental states is directly based on physical predicates, objects and so on, as opposed to abstract, tailor‐made, mental ones. That is, the representation scheme is itself explicitly metaphor‐imbued.