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On the importance of evidence: a response to Halpern
Author(s) -
Cheeseman Peter C.
Publication year - 1990
Publication title -
computational intelligence
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.353
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1467-8640
pISSN - 0824-7935
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8640.1990.tb00138.x
Subject(s) - bayesian probability , probabilistic logic , predicate (mathematical logic) , epistemology , computer science , mathematics , artificial intelligence , mathematical economics , psychology , philosophy , programming language
Halperri argues for alternative non‐Bayesian approaches to uncertainty based on problems he perceives in the Bayesian approach. In particular, he argues for a distinction between degrees of belief and statistical statements (based on the concept of random sampling). In this response I show that there is no difference between these two concepts in the Bayesian framework, and that the replacement of variables by constants in probabilistic predicate calculus expressions is valid, despite Halpern's objections. The main reason for his rejection of the simpler approach is that he does not condition his belief statements on the evidence used to form these beliefs, and so gets into trouble when new evidence is received. This failure to properly take evidence into account invalidates most of his other criticisms. While I approve of his call for more formal rigor in representing Bayesian practice, his claim to have provided a semantics is misleading – what he has provided is not operational.