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Children's Sensitivity to Their Own Relative Ignorance: Handling of Possibilities Under Epistemic and Physical Uncertainty
Author(s) -
Robinson Elizabeth J.,
Rowley Martin G.,
Beck Sarah R.,
Carroll Dan J.,
Apperly Ian A.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
child development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.103
H-Index - 257
eISSN - 1467-8624
pISSN - 0009-3920
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2006.00964.x
Subject(s) - ignorance , psychology , perspective (graphical) , the imaginary , block (permutation group theory) , epistemology , theory of mind , curse , social psychology , cognitive psychology , psychoanalysis , cognition , sociology , artificial intelligence , philosophy , mathematics , computer science , geometry , neuroscience , anthropology
Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 ( N =61), 4‐ to 6‐year‐olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 ( N =30; 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds) and 3 ( N =80; 5‐ to 8‐year‐olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one. The results have implications for interpretive theory of mind and “curse of knowledge.”