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Children's Undrstanding of Epistemic Conduct in Self‐Deception and Other False Belief Stories
Author(s) -
Johnson Edward A.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
child development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.103
H-Index - 257
eISSN - 1467-8624
pISSN - 0009-3920
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.1997.tb01988.x
Subject(s) - deception , psychology , false belief , self deception , lying , social psychology , epistemology , theory of mind , relevance (law) , misconduct , cognitive psychology , cognition , philosophy , medicine , neuroscience , political science , law , radiology
In self‐deception persons accept false belief through a motivated disregard for countervailing evidence. Such epistemic misconduct renders them responsisble for their own deception. It was hypothesized that children's understanding of this responsibility would be associated with an understanding of how evidence informs belief. In the study 4‐ to 9‐year‐old children's understanding of the relations between false belief, evidence, and epistemic responsibility was examined using stories involving self‐deception, lying, and misleading appearances. Results indicated that younger children who understood false belief understood simpler types of deception, but that understanding self‐deceivers' epistmic responsibility was limited to older children who understood the relevance of evidence to belief formation.