Premium
Acquiring a Naive Theory of Kinship through Inference
Author(s) -
Springer Ken
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
child development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.103
H-Index - 257
eISSN - 1467-8624
pISSN - 0009-3920
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.1995.tb00889.x
Subject(s) - kinship , psychology , analogy , meaning (existential) , developmental psychology , inference , theory of mind , social psychology , epistemology , cognition , sociology , philosophy , neuroscience , anthropology , psychotherapist
The present study focused on how children acquire a naive theory of kinship. Young children appear to have theoretical beliefs about the biological meaning of kinship relations. It was argued here that these beliefs reflect inductive inferences from simple facts about prenatal growth (e.g, where babies grow). An informal model of the inferences linking facts to theory was proposed and tested. In Experiment 1, 4–7‐year‐olds who knew the basic facts of prenatal growth were most likely to also express the naive theory of kinship. Virtually none of the children who expressed the theory were unaware of the basic facts. In Experiment 2, teaching the facts to a sample of preschoolers led to some increase in their acceptance of the kinship theory. Overall, the results implicate a type of theory building that involves inferences from preexisting knowledge rather than structural change, use of analogy, or acquisition of new knowledge.