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Children's Obligatory and Discretionary Moral Judgments
Author(s) -
Kahn Peter H.
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
child development
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.103
H-Index - 257
eISSN - 1467-8624
pISSN - 0009-3920
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8624.1992.tb01637.x
Subject(s) - psychology , moral disengagement , social cognitive theory of morality , moral reasoning , social psychology , moral development , moral psychology , conceptualization , moral obligation , social intuitionism , proposition , morality , moral authority , moral character , obligation , developmental psychology , epistemology , law , philosophy , artificial intelligence , computer science , political science
This study examined children's obligatory moral judgments (which reflect a moral requirement) and discretionary moral judgments (which reflect moral worthiness, but not a requirement). 72 children participated across grades 2, 5, and 8 (mean ages, 8–3, 11–0, and 13–11). Children were interviewed in response to stimulus stories that controlled for the degree of agent's cost (low and high) for performing positive moral acts (giving money for food to an impoverished, hungry person) and negative moral acts (not stealing money for food). Results showed that negative moral acts were more often conceived as obligatory than positive moral acts. In addition, the results support the proposition that children's concepts of obligation underlie judgments to codify law, that justice reasoning builds on concepts of welfare, and that with increasing age discretionary moral reasoning incorporates such character traits as benevolence, sacrifice, and supererogation. Discussion includes consideration of how the study's conceptualization and analysis can provide guidance to a moral‐developmental research program.