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The Ethics of Tax Evasion
Author(s) -
BAGUS PHILIPP,
BLOCK WALTER,
EABRASU MARIAN,
HOWDEN DAVID,
ROSTAN JÉRÉMIE
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
business and society review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.524
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 1467-8594
pISSN - 0045-3609
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8594.2011.00390.x
Subject(s) - receipt , tax evasion , evasion (ethics) , payment , preference , public economics , economics , business , element (criminal law) , law and economics , microeconomics , accounting , law , political science , finance , immune system , immunology , biology
A wide and growing consensus views taxation as fundamentally coercive in nature. Regardless of the magnitude of the tax or the agents perpetrating it, this fundamental coercive element remains. Tax evasion must consequently be treated as an effort to convert this coercive behavior into voluntary transactions. By altering the conditions of payment and receipt of goods and services, taxation veils both consumers' and producers' preferences. Critics of tax evasion have left unanswered the question as to how society will efficiently allocate its scarce resources under coercively falsified preference signals. Accepting that preferences are best signaled voluntarily and via market participants directly, we argue that tax evasion must result in increased economic efficiency, as well as allow for a reinstatement of an individual's right to contract freely.