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Author(s) -
Kim Chulyoung
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00448.x
Subject(s) - decision maker , advice (programming) , law and economics , economics , cheap talk , microeconomics , business , public economics , management science , computer science , programming language
This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole ([Dewatripont, M, 1999]), to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.