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AN ULTIMATUM WAGE BARGAINING EXPERIMENT ON TRADE UNION EFFICIENCY
Author(s) -
Andreou Adamos,
Andreou Sofia N.,
GarcíaGallego Aurora,
Georgantzís Nikolaos
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x
Subject(s) - wage bargaining , economics , wage , position (finance) , labour economics , ultimatum game , microeconomics , trade union , finance
We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non‐binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.