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CROSS‐COUNTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND POLITICALLY DRIVEN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
Author(s) -
Hwang Uk,
Lee Jinkwon
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2009.00333.x
Subject(s) - inefficiency , negotiation , economics , grossman , politics , outcome (game theory) , international trade , sovereignty , international economics , technology transfer , public economics , microeconomics , political science , keynesian economics , law
Grossman and Helpman highlighted a political framework to internalize inefficiency incurred due to unilateral trade policy implementation by sovereign countries. This paper extensively adopts their framework to explore the effects of special interest politics on governments under negotiation to forge international environmental standards to control global emission. Particular attention is given to a case in which negotiation is driven by transferring the abatement technology. Within a specific factor model of international trade, improving the abatement efficiency through technology transfer can give the most mutually beneficial outcome, achieving the lowest level of global pollution compared to other political benchmarks.