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THE ‘CHILLING EFFECT’ OF CONVENTIONAL ARBITRATION: A COUNTEREXAMPLE
Author(s) -
Treble John G.
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8586.1989.tb00278.x
Subject(s) - counterexample , arbitration , simple (philosophy) , context (archaeology) , economics , microeconomics , computer science , law and economics , mathematical economics , risk analysis (engineering) , business , mathematics , law , political science , biology , epistemology , philosophy , discrete mathematics , paleontology
In the context of a simple model, it is demonstrated that it is possible for a conventional arbitrator to determine his decision in such a way as to remove the so‐called ‘chilling effect’. It is shown that an arbitrator adopting the kind of rule envisaged here would be more successful in moderating claims of the negotiators than would a final‐offer arbitrator.