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DOES A NORMAL FOETUS REALLY HAVE A FUTURE OF VALUE? A REPLY TO MARQUIS
Author(s) -
LOVERING ROBERT P.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
bioethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.494
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1467-8519
pISSN - 0269-9702
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2005.00430.x
Subject(s) - prima facie , value (mathematics) , premise , abortion , philosophy , epistemology , law and economics , psychology , sociology , pregnancy , biology , machine learning , computer science , genetics
The traditional approach to the abortion debate revolves around numerous issues, such as whether the foetus is a person, whether the foetus has rights, and more. Don Marquis suggests that this traditional approach leads to a standoff and that the abortion debate ‘requires a different strategy.’ 1 Hence his ‘future of value’ strategy, which is summarized as follows:1 A normal foetus has a future of value. 2 Depriving a normal foetus of a future of value imposes a misfortune on it. 3 Imposing a misfortune on a normal foetus is prima facie wrong. 4 Therefore, depriving a normal foetus of a future of value is prima facie wrong. 5 Killing a normal foetus deprives it of a future of value. 6 Therefore, killing a normal foetus is prima facie wrong.In this paper, I argue that Marquis's strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person – a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value.