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Strategic issues in global climate change policy *
Author(s) -
Clarke Harry
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
australian journal of agricultural and resource economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.683
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-8489
pISSN - 1364-985X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2010.00485.x
Subject(s) - regret , dilemma , incentive , greenhouse gas , carbon tax , climate policy , economics , adaptation (eye) , environmental economics , climate change , prisoner's dilemma , game theory , natural resource economics , microeconomics , computer science , ecology , philosophy , physics , epistemology , machine learning , optics , biology
An analysis of prospects for deriving self‐enforcing, global, greenhouse gas emission mitigation agreements is provided. Policy spillovers and carbon leakages are accounted for. Situations where mitigation effort should be concentrated in particular countries and where efficient outcomes can be fostered by international trade in emissions permits are discussed. The use of auxiliary policies to transform intractable Prisoner’s Dilemma incentive problems to more tractable problems, the role of policy commitments and the strategic implications of ‘no regret’ and ‘adaptation’ policies are analysed. Dynamic and repeated game formulations are outlined.