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A COMMENT ON KLIEVE‐MACAULAY'S SOUTHERN BLUEFIN TUNA GAME
Author(s) -
Simmons Phil,
Wallace Lee
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
australian journal of agricultural economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.683
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-8489
pISSN - 0004-9395
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8489.1995.tb00555.x
Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , tuna , mathematical economics , game theory , economics , fishery , set (abstract data type) , computer science , fish <actinopterygii> , biology , programming language
Klieve and MacAulay (1993) (KM) analyse bargaining between the Australian and Japanese Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) industries using game theory. The KM model is a Nash equilibrium with symmetrical information, threat functions and a set of biological constraints. When we attempted to include the New Zealand SBT industry as a player in the KM model, we discovered important shortcomings in it. In this comment, we outline three major shortcomings in the KM model and propose an alternative model of a Nash equilibrium for the SBT industry.