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For the Student : Matching and Economic Design
Author(s) -
Artemov Georgy,
Feldmann Sven,
Loertscher Simon
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
australian economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.308
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8462
pISSN - 0004-9018
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8462.2011.00666.x
Subject(s) - matching (statistics) , key (lock) , context (archaeology) , computer science , mechanism (biology) , stability (learning theory) , mechanism design , theoretical computer science , mathematical economics , mathematics , epistemology , machine learning , computer security , statistics , philosophy , paleontology , biology
This article presents a brief survey of two‐sided matching. We introduce the reader to the problem of two‐sided matching in the context of the college admission model and explain two central requirements for a matching mechanism: stability and non‐manipulability. We show how the frequently used ‘Boston Mechanism’ fails these key requirements and describe how an alternative, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, leads to stable matchings but fails to be non‐manipulable in general. A third mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle, is efficient and non‐manipulable when only one side of the match acts strategically. We also discuss some applications of matching theory .