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R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS *
Author(s) -
BÁRCENARUIZ JUAN CARLOS,
CAMPO M. LUZ
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8454.2009.00370.x
Subject(s) - productivity , wage , cournot competition , negotiation , economics , labour economics , incentive , wage bargaining , investment (military) , duopoly , microeconomics , politics , macroeconomics , political science , law
This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity.