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COORDINATION INCENTIVES UNDER COMPLEMENTARY COST‐REDUCING TECHNOLOGIES *
Author(s) -
GONZÁLEZMAESTRE MIGUEL
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
australian economic papers
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.351
H-Index - 15
eISSN - 1467-8454
pISSN - 0004-900X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8454.2008.00343.x
Subject(s) - incentive , duopoly , industrial organization , business , microeconomics , risk analysis (engineering) , cournot competition , environmental economics , economics
This paper focuses on the optimal regulation regarding technology transfer and mergers in a duopoly model where two complementary technologies can be developed. On the one hand, we show that there are cases where a prohibitive policy regarding (cross) licensing agreements can be socially desirable. On the other hand, our analysis stresses that, in many cases, there are important coordination problems that cannot be overcome by means of cross‐licensing agreements and merger is the optimal policy.