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AUCTIONS, EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS *
Author(s) -
Chong Eshien,
Huet Freddy,
Saussier Stéphane
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
annals of public and cooperative economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.526
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1467-8292
pISSN - 1370-4788
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00318.x
Subject(s) - competition (biology) , monopoly , common value auction , economics , business , duration (music) , microeconomics , industrial organization , market economy , literature , art , ecology , biology
** : Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect’ between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect’, reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re‐auctioned.