Premium
From the Theory of Aid Effectiveness to the Practice: The European Commission's Governance Incentive Tranche
Author(s) -
Molenaers Nadia,
Nijs Leen
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
development policy review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.671
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1467-7679
pISSN - 0950-6764
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-7679.2009.00459.x
Subject(s) - tranche , incentive , corporate governance , leverage (statistics) , aid effectiveness , development aid , modalities , economics , european commission , business , political science , developing country , economic growth , international economics , finance , sociology , market economy , european union , social science , machine learning , computer science
Around the turn of the millennium a growing consensus emerged on the dos and don'ts of development assistance, based on lessons drawn from failed aid. Donors now increasingly see aid as a leverage to induce or support governance reforms in recipient countries. The EC, which considers itself to be a forerunner of the new aid approach, has recently launched a new instrument to incentivise such reforms: the ‘Governance Incentive Tranche’. However, the evidence presented in this article suggests that, in design and practice, the incentive tranche is surprisingly similar to some of the unsuccessful aid modalities of the past.