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Explaining the Failure of Thailand's Anti‐corruption Regime
Author(s) -
Mutebi Alex M.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
development and change
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.267
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-7660
pISSN - 0012-155X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-7660.2008.00472.x
Subject(s) - technocracy , language change , contradiction , politics , legislature , state (computer science) , political economy , government (linguistics) , nexus (standard) , political science , law and economics , public administration , development economics , economics , law , art , philosophy , linguistics , literature , epistemology , algorithm , computer science , embedded system
Despite the presence of strong anti‐corruption policies, state and regulatory capture may persist and thrive in the highest echelons of government. This article explores such a case, that of Thailand under former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The author argues that the primary explanation for this contradiction lies in Thailand's post‐1997 anti‐corruption framework. Because of the ascendancy of a business–politics nexus more powerful in blocking reform than Thai constitutional drafters had anticipated, and because of the decline in political contestability as a result of Thaksin's control of both the legislature and the executive, the stage was set for a dramatic increase in the levels of state capture. The author suggests that effective control of such political corruption calls for a strategy which extends far beyond the technocratic approaches used by Thai reformers in the mid to late 1990s.