The Hubris Hypothesis: You Can Self‐Enhance, But You'd Better Not Show It

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self‐superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self‐superiority claims (“I am better than others”; Experiments 1–7), noncomparative positive claims (“I am good”; Experiments 1–2, 4), self‐equality claims (“I am as good as others”; Experiments 3–4, 6), temporally comparative self‐superiority claims (“I am better than I used to be”; Experiment 5), other‐superiority claims (“S/he is better than others”; Experiment 6), and self‐superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1–7) and made inferences about the claimant's self‐view and view of others (Experiments 4–7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self‐superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4–6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self‐superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self‐superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self‐claims or self‐improvement claims.