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Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?
Author(s) -
Quinn Robin A.,
Houts Arthur C.,
Graesser Arthur C.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
journal of personality
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.082
H-Index - 144
eISSN - 1467-6494
pISSN - 0022-3506
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00297.x
Subject(s) - morality , psychology , moral reasoning , moral disengagement , epistemology , moral psychology , social cognitive theory of morality , subject (documents) , moral development , focus (optics) , social psychology , philosophy , physics , library science , computer science , optics
ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject‐based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically.