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On the Distinction between Moral Thinking and Thinking about Morality: A Reply to Quinn, Houts, and Graesser
Author(s) -
Shaffer David R.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
journal of personality
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.082
H-Index - 144
eISSN - 1467-6494
pISSN - 0022-3506
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00296.x
Subject(s) - morality , psychology , meaning (existential) , moral reasoning , value (mathematics) , epistemology , naturalism , moral psychology , social psychology , moral disengagement , moral development , philosophy , psychotherapist , machine learning , computer science
Quinn, Houts, and Graesser (this issue) have misconstrued my earlier commentary, attributing several conclusions to me that I neither made nor intended. Moreover, they continue to confuse moral thinking, reasoning, and related constructs with thinking about the meaning of the term “morality.” If Quinn et al. are ever to achieve their aims of using the “question‐answering” method to study naturalistic moral reasoning and/or to assess the merits of value‐prescriptive theories of morality, they will have to ask questions that can indeed illustrate the underpinnings of subjects' moral thought.