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Conflict for Mutual Gains?*
Author(s) -
Bacon Nicolas,
Blyton Paul
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of management studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.398
H-Index - 184
eISSN - 1467-6486
pISSN - 0022-2380
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00668.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , business , productivity , industrial relations , labour economics , collective bargaining , public relations , marketing , economics , political science , management , economic growth , law
This paper adopts Walton and McKersie's Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations to examine the outcomes of industrial relations negotiations to implement teamworking. Negotiations from 21 departments across two integrated steelworks are classified into four negotiation patterns, each producing different outcomes from teamworking for managers and employees. Managers secured lower manning and increased productivity in negotiations both in departments characterized throughout by cooperation and those characterized by conflict. However, mutual gains were secured only where union negotiators pursued conflict tactics during bargaining. In those departments where union negotiators adopted more conflictual bargaining tactics, more employees reported pay increases and greater satisfaction with teamworking agreements, compared with employees in more ‘cooperative’ departments. ‘Mixed’ bargaining approaches in other departments were less successful, particularly for union negotiators.