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EXECUTIVE REWARD SYSTEMS: A CROSS‐NATIONAL COMPARISON*
Author(s) -
Pennings Johannes M.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
journal of management studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.398
H-Index - 184
eISSN - 1467-6486
pISSN - 0022-2380
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6486.1993.tb00304.x
Subject(s) - executive compensation , expectancy theory , compensation (psychology) , agency (philosophy) , benchmark (surveying) , executive summary , value (mathematics) , principal–agent problem , psychology , accounting , social psychology , management , business , sociology , economics , computer science , corporate governance , finance , social science , geography , geodesy , machine learning
This article examines executive compensation in the United States, France, and the Netherlands. A brief review of executive compensation literature is conducted to expose its implicit value systems. Next, a qualitative study examines the interpretive schemas that executives express about the pay‐performance relationship; US‐developed expectancy theory and agency theory serve as a benchmark. the results indicate that US executives understand compensation in different terms from those employed by their European counterparts.