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Cartel Laws Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms, and Collectivist Business Cultures
Author(s) -
Stephan Andreas
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
journal of law and society
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.263
H-Index - 48
eISSN - 1467-6478
pISSN - 0263-323X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6478.2010.00507.x
Subject(s) - cartel , collectivism , damages , sanctions , language change , enforcement , competition (biology) , law and economics , law , business , law enforcement , political science , economics , collusion , industrial organization , individualism , biology , art , ecology , literature
The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in United States Antitrust Law. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. This paper identifies three issues which may undermine the universal efficacy of these cartel laws: (i) corruption and organized crime; (ii) social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (iii) collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.