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Resale and Collusion in A Dynamic Market for Semidurable Goods
Author(s) -
Schiraldi Pasquale,
Nava Francesco
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the journal of industrial economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.93
H-Index - 77
eISSN - 1467-6451
pISSN - 0022-1821
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2012.00484.x
Subject(s) - incentive , collusion , oligopoly , monopoly , microeconomics , economics , depreciation (economics) , industrial organization , business , cournot competition , profit (economics) , capital formation , financial capital
The paper studies the incentives to form collusive agreements when goods can be traded in second‐hand markets. It will be shown that such incentives crucially depend on the rate of depreciation of the durable good and on consumer heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper shows that an active second‐hand market may strengthen the incentives to collude, as do policies that affect the functioning of the second‐hand market (e.g., leasing policy and buy‐back). It will also be argued that the oligopoly incentives to adopt strategies that strengthen collusion often differ from the monopoly incentives to increase profits.