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Making and Remaking State Institutional Arrangements: The Case of U.S. Trade Policy in the 1970s*
Author(s) -
CHOREV NITSAN
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
journal of historical sociology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.186
H-Index - 26
eISSN - 1467-6443
pISSN - 0952-1909
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2005.00245.x
Subject(s) - outcome (game theory) , institutional change , balance (ability) , state (computer science) , distribution (mathematics) , institutional analysis , political science , political economy , dynamics (music) , economics , economic system , law and economics , public administration , sociology , microeconomics , social science , mathematical analysis , pedagogy , mathematics , computer science , medicine , physical medicine and rehabilitation , algorithm
The article describes the struggle between free‐trade advocates and protectionists in the early 1970s in the United States over the institutional arrangements governing trade policy formation and implementation. The analysis of the struggle and its impacts offers several modifications to historical institutionalist analysis of institutional dynamics and change. First, the uneven distribution of benefits by institutions is an intended outcome of institutional designers. Second, institutions are causally effective when they reflect a balance of forces that no longer exists. Third, unanticipated effects within given institutional arrangements are the outcome of intended counter‐strategies.