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Falsificationism and Fallibilism as Epistemic Foundations of Economics: A Critical View
Author(s) -
SALANTI ANDREA
Publication year - 1987
Publication title -
kyklos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.766
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-6435
pISSN - 0023-5962
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1987.tb00686.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , philosophy of science , criticism , perspective (graphical) , rationality , positive economics , economics , philosophy , sociology , political science , law , computer science , artificial intelligence
SUMMARY A new awareness of the major issues in the contemporary philosophy of science is one of the most remarkable features of current debates on economic methodology. Under the prevailing influence of POPPER'S writings, for example, it has been repeatedly maintained that POPPERian falsificationism ought to be regarded as the proper methodological framework for the appraisal of economic theories . More recently, it has also been argued we should see POPPERian fallibilism as the right epistemological perspective for approaching the problem of agents' behaviour in economic theory. This paper suggests that both such perspectives are doomed to failure: the former because of the heuristic nature of most economic theories, the latter for having overlooked the sharp contrast between ‘practical’ and ‘scientific’ rationality which is so typical of POPPERian epistemology. As often the case when methodology is concerned, criticism is easier than the provision of a sound alternative. We suggest, however, that a fallibilist economist and a falsificationist economic man could do economics a much better service than vice versa.