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Women, Men, and Society *
Author(s) -
Moreh Jacob
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
kyklos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.766
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-6435
pISSN - 0023-5962
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1986.tb00768.x
Subject(s) - patriarchy , welfare , utilitarianism , economics , ideal (ethics) , bargaining problem , sociology , positive economics , mathematical economics , microeconomics , law and economics , law , political science , gender studies , market economy
SUMMARY Ideal solutions based on two bargaining models (RAIFFA, NASH) and two moral principles (Utilitarianism, RAWLS'S Difference Principle) are applied to the sharing of the welfare produced in the family between the representative man ( M ) and representative woman ( W ). The good produced by the family has a strong element of public good enjoyed by M and W . Two different assumptions are possible regarding the relative efficiency of M and W in producing the public good: (1) The feminist hypothesis: they are equally efficient, (2) The patriarchy hypothesis: men are on the average more dominant than women, and better able to hold upper positions in hierarchies. Hence they are more efficient and are entitled to status. If the feminist hypothesis is correct, M and W should, according to the ethical principles, have equal welfare and should supply equal efforts. However, the bargaining solutions generally adjudge M more welfare than W , mainly because of his higher security level. If one accepts the patriarchy hypothesis, some of the utility which M derives from his status should redound to W 's advantage (except under Utilitarianism) so that she is required to supply less effort. Paradoxically, this may mean that M should do more domestic work.