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PUBLIC GOODS AND THE STABILITY OF FEDERALISM *
Author(s) -
Breton Albert
Publication year - 1970
Publication title -
kyklos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.766
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-6435
pISSN - 0023-5962
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1970.tb01050.x
Subject(s) - federalism , jurisdiction , public good , stability (learning theory) , economics , federal court , public economics , law and economics , microeconomics , political science , law , computer science , politics , supreme court , machine learning
SUMMARY Some federal structures are and have been stable for relatively long periods; others, though apparently stable, are chronically subject to important strains, while others still are either unstable or have ceased to exist as federal entities. In the paper, I develop a limited model of federalism, built on the number and properties of public goods, which appears to account for some of the observable stability features of federal structure. Essentially, the model assumes that when individuals in one jurisdiction do not only passively receive spillovers from other jurisdictions, but react and adjust to them, possibilities of conflict exist which can only be resolved by the creation of the appropriate machinery. It is shown how a change in the number of public goods can affect the outcome.