LES ÉATATS‐UNIS BÉANÉAFICIENT‐ILS DU ≪DROIT DE SEIGNEUR>?

SUMMARY A standard opinion is that the international reserve role of the dollar gives a 100 per cent seignorage profit to the United States: they can take over foreign firms by printing notes which other countries as a whole will forever keep in portfolio. An emerging opinion is that this is no seignorage since these dollar reserves yield interest: in fact, the U. S. pay with perpetuities. However, each year the interest paid is matched by the increase in reserves (exactly in case of balanced growth where interest and growth rates are equal), so that they cancel each other: on the average, there is no real interest paid, just a yearly mark‐up of the reserves by the amount of the interest. But, if the operation is neutral in real terms in the current year, there remains a 100 per cent seignorage on the initial accumulation of dollars. And the present value of this seignorage is its amount increased at compound interest, that is the value of present reserves. Therefore the first mentioned opinion arrives at the right conclusion, although through faulty reasoning. In addition, the initial Western European dollar accumulation roughly coincide in amount and time with Marshall Plan gifts. It is as if the dollars received have just been kept in cash. The U. S. seignorage profit cancels out the grant. There has been no Marshall aid. This paper also analyses the international seignorage implications of the following phenomena: payment of short term interest rate on de facto long term reserves, which represent liquidity services; term and volatility differences between private and official reserves; U. S. inflation; U. S. federal bank required reserves which yield no interest; international politics influences; gold; U. S. monetary policies.