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PARETO OPTIMALITY AND THE CHURCH AS AN ECONOMIC ENTERPRISE *
Author(s) -
Kane Edward J.
Publication year - 1966
Publication title -
kyklos
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.766
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-6435
pISSN - 0023-5962
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6435.1966.tb00833.x
Subject(s) - analogy , pareto principle , welfare , preference , interpretation (philosophy) , economics , natural law , principal (computer security) , order (exchange) , social welfare , positive economics , sociology , microeconomics , law , political science , epistemology , philosophy , market economy , computer science , operations management , linguistics , finance , operating system
SUMMARY In order to test the general applicability of Paretian welfare principles and to explain intermittent changes in Church regulations, this paper explores the economic implication of Roman Catholic moral philosophy. As a first step, Catholic (or Scholastic) ethical norms are incorporated into the familiar form of individual and social welfare functions. Because Church behavior ought to promote the welfare of the membership, these functions become, in turn, building blocks for a theory of hierarchical decisionmaking. The analysis establishes an analogy between the Church and an oligopolistic business firm and supports two principal conclusions. First, conditions for Pareto optimality which are consistent with Scholastic welfare criteria do not coincide with those of ordinary welfare economics. This is because individual preference (utility) functions often rank material over spiritual good, something which Scholastic functions may never do. Second, treated as objective functions, Scholastic welfare indices afford valuable insight into the doctrinal history of the Church: into the process governing secular changes in the Church's interpretation of the current moral implications of Natural Law.