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VOTING, INEQUALITY AND REDISTRIBUTION
Author(s) -
Borck Rainald
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
journal of economic surveys
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.657
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1467-6419
pISSN - 0950-0804
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00265.x
Subject(s) - redistribution (election) , economics , inequality , voting , economic inequality , majority rule , public good , redistribution of income and wealth , public economics , labour economics , politics , demographic economics , microeconomics , political science , mathematical analysis , mathematics , law
This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assumptions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive taxation chosen by the median income earner. If the median is poorer than average, redistribution is from rich to poor, and increasing inequality increases redistribution. However, under different assumptions about the economic environment, redistribution may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution. Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, public provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion.