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THE ECONOMICS OF VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
Author(s) -
Pomfret Richard
Publication year - 1989
Publication title -
journal of economic surveys
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.657
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1467-6419
pISSN - 0950-0804
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6419.1989.tb00067.x
Subject(s) - economic rent , collusion , economics , imperfect competition , monopsony , section (typography) , competition (biology) , international economics , imperfect , microeconomics , public economics , business , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , advertising , biology
. The three substantive sections of this survey deal with the economic consequences of voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs), e.g. the Multi‐Fibre Arrangement and VERs on Japanese auto exports. Section 2 focuses on the disposition of quota rents under the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and the absence of substitute suppliers. Section 3 considers imperfect competition and the role of VERs as cartelization instruments, facilitating collusion. Section 4 analyzes the discriminatory effects of VERs when there are third country suppliers. A broad conclusion is that the economic consequences of VERs are more complex than the standard trade policy analysis based on tariffs because of the issues discussed in Sections 3 and 4.