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Enforcement and disclosure under regulation fair disclosure: an empirical analysis
Author(s) -
Griffin Paul A.,
Lont David H.,
Segal Benjamin
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
accounting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-629X
pISSN - 0810-5391
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-629x.2011.00446.x
Subject(s) - enforcement , public disclosure , business , accounting , action (physics) , institutional investor , public information , security market , finance , law , public relations , corporate governance , political science , mechanical engineering , engineering , physics , quantum mechanics
While Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) was designed to benefit investors by curbing the selective disclosure of material non‐public information to ‘covered’ investors, such as analysts and institutional investors, it can also impose costs. This paper finds that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and disclosure costs. First, investors cannot recover as part of an SEC enforcement action the gains to covered investors from their alleged use of the non‐public information. Second, investors lose because the market responds negatively to an SEC enforcement announcement. Third, investors suffer because some companies post their FD filings well after the due date, without earlier public disclosure.