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Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom
Author(s) -
Florackis Chrisostomos,
Ozkan Aydin
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
accounting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-629X
pISSN - 0810-5391
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-629x.2009.00296.x
Subject(s) - leverage (statistics) , corporate governance , incentive , business , accounting , executive compensation , sample (material) , capital structure , economics , microeconomics , finance , debt , machine learning , computer science , chemistry , chromatography
This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999–2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm‐specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non‐monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure.