z-logo
Premium
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE BY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: EVIDENCE FROM AUSTRALIAN LIFE INSURERS PROMOTING INVESTMENT‐RELATED CONTRACTS
Author(s) -
Klumpes Paul J.M.
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
accounting and finance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.645
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1467-629X
pISSN - 0810-5391
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-629x.1995.tb00273.x
Subject(s) - life insurance , business , liability , voluntary disclosure , intermediary , financial intermediary , investment (military) , finance , turnover , actuarial science , financial risk , economics , management , politics , political science , law
Voluntary financial disclosure by Australian life insurers promoting investment‐related contracts is predicted to be related to fees, funds under management, investment risk and return, liability risk and marketing costs factors. The decision to voluntarily disclose various forms of financial data in documents promoting investment‐related contracts was studied during 1989‐90. Life insurance managers providing financial disclosures tend to: (a) charge lower fees, (b) hold larger funds under management, (c) are exposed to higher investment risk, (d) are exposed to lower liability risk and (e) bear lower marketing costs. This evidence supports Mayers and Smiths' [1981] positive theory of insurance‐related contracting.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here