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Competing Regulatory Agencies With Conflicting Agendas: Setting Standards For Cash Flow Reporting In Australia
Author(s) -
WALKER R. G.,
ROBINSON S. P.
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
abacus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.632
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1467-6281
pISSN - 0001-3072
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-6281.1994.tb00346.x
Subject(s) - accounting , cash flow , business , public economics , economics
Financial accounting regulatory arrangements adopted in most Western countries often involve the participation of (and interactions between) public‐sector and private‐sector regulatory agencies. The political process associated with the development of accounting rules not only involves the efforts of interested parties seeking to secure the content of rules favourable to their interests but also the behaviours of regulatory agencies as they compete to influence or control the regulatory ‘agenda’. Regulatory agencies develop their own agendas, in light of their own perceived priorities and the regulatory initiatives of other agencies. The placing of an accounting issue on the agenda of one agency may be warmly supported by other agencies or, alternatively, be viewed as a threat to the regulatory ambitions of those other agencies. This case study reviews the emergence and eventual resolution of an accounting issue that was initially promoted by a government agency in April 1984 but then ultimately developed as a professional accounting standard in December 1991. The study describes the activities of public and private‐sector agencies during this eight‐year period as they responded to proposals for the introduction of disclosure rules concerning cash flows. Evidence was obtained from public records, documents provided by interest groups, and structured and semi‐structured interviews with key participants in the events described. The analysis is underscored by our understanding of competitive regulatory interactions and formal models for analysing agenda entrance (Cobb et al. 1976). This analysis shows how the profession's standard‐setting body was unable to control the global agenda for accounting rule‐making as a consequence of the intervention of another body, the Australian Stock Exchange.