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ESTIMATING TIME‐VARYING BARGAINING POWER: A FISHERY APPLICATION
Author(s) -
FELL HARRISON,
HAYNIE ALAN
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00275.x
Subject(s) - economic rent , bargaining power , economics , point (geometry) , power (physics) , fishing , microeconomics , fishery , physics , quantum mechanics , biology , geometry , mathematics
We propose an unobserved‐components‐inspired approach to estimate time‐varying bargaining power in bilateral bargaining frameworks. We apply the technique to an ex‐vessel fish market that changed management systems from a regulated open‐access system to an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system over the timespan analyzed. We find that post‐IFQ implementation fishers do improve their bargaining power and thus accrue more of the rents generated by the fishery. However, unlike previous studies, we find that fishers do not move to a point of complete rent extraction. Rather, fishers and processors appear to be in a near‐symmetric bargaining situation post‐IFQ implementation. ( JEL C22, L11, Q22)